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This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked ﬁrms. In a spatial
economy composed of two regions, a monopolist ﬁrm supplies an input to two
consumer goods ﬁrms that compete in quantities. The interaction between the
ﬁrms is modelled by means of a three-stage game, where the ﬁrms ﬁrst select
locations, then the upstream ﬁrm chooses thedelivered prices of the intermediate
good, and ﬁnally the downstream ﬁr m ss e l e c tq u a n t i t i e so ft h eﬁnal good. It is
concluded that agglomeration is more likely to occur when the ratio between the
transport cost of the intermediate good and the transport cost of the ﬁnal good
is higher. If this proportion is low, the existence of an agglomeration varies
nonmonotonically with transport costs.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the absence of labor mobility, the agglomeration of productive activity
follows from interactions between ﬁrms. As noted by MARSHALL (1920),
these interactions can be technological, e.g. spillovers which are not mediated
by the market, or they can take the form of an exchange of intermediate
goods. In this case, the saving in the transport cost of intermediate goods is
a powerful incentive for the agglomeration of vertically-related ﬁrms.
In the literature that addresses this issue, the locational interaction of
vertically-related ﬁr m si sm o d e l e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y . A ni m p e r f e c t l y
competitive upstream industry supplies an intermediate good to a down-
stream industry, which can be either perfectly or imperfectly competitive.
While AMITI (2001), FUJITA and HAMAGUCHI (2002) and FUJITA and
THISSE (2002) assume that the downstream industry is perfectly competi-
tive, VENABLES (1996) and BELLEFLAMME and TOULEMONDE (2003)
make the opposite assumption that the ﬁnal industry is imperfectly compet-
itive. It is further assumed that the intermediate good and the consumer
good have diﬀerent transport costs, which vary independently.
Under these circumstances, there are two diﬀerent eﬀects that may lead
to a dispersion or agglomeration of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst one is a ”competition
eﬀect”, according to which consumer goods tend to disperse in space in or-
der to relax competition with neighboring ﬁrms and to locate close to local
demand. This eﬀect is stronger when the transport cost of the consumer
good is higher leading to the geographical isolation of the ﬁrms. The second
eﬀect is a ”cost linkage” eﬀect: if both upstream and downstream ﬁrms ag-
glomerate in a region, the latter can obtain the intermediate good at a lower
delivered price through a saving in the transport costs of the input. There-
fore, agglomeration enables consumer goods ﬁrms to obtain lower production
costs and upstream ﬁrms to obtain a greater demand. This ”network eﬀect”
assumes two diﬀerent forms depending on the speciﬁcm a r k e ts t r u c t u r et h a t
is assumed in the upstream industry. If this structure is Dixit-Stiglitz mo-
nopolistic competition, as in FUJITA and HAMAGUCHI (2002), FUJITA
and THISSE (2002) and VENABLES (1996), each downstream ﬁrm uses a
composite of all the varieties produced by the upstream industry. Hence, the
cost linkage works directly through a decrease in the transport costs of the
varieties leading in an increase in the price index of the composite interme-
diate good. If the market structure in the upstream industry is a Cournot
oligopoly, as in AMITI (2001) and BELLEFLAMME and TOULEMONDEAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 2
(2003), the cost linkage follows from the increased competition brought about
by the agglomeration in the upstream industry that decreases the price of the
intermediate good and the production costs of consumer goods ﬁrms. The
strength of the cost linkage eﬀect is proportional to the transport cost of the
intermediate good.
With this framework, the literature concludes that agglomeration occurs
when the transport cost of the intermediate good is high in relation to the
transport cost of the ﬁnal good. In this case, no downstream ﬁrm has any
incentive to choose an isolated location, as this move would not greatly de-
crease the delivery cost of the ﬁnal good and would substantially increase the
transport cost of the required input. Furthermore no input supplier would
gain by leaving the agglomeration, as it would have to bear the high transport
cost of the intermediate good to the ﬁnal goods ﬁrms (FUJITA and THISSE,
2002). If the transport cost of the intermediate good is lowered in relation to
the transport cost of the consumer good, a dispersion of downstream ﬁrms
can occur (FUJITA and HAMAGUCHI, 2002).
A common assumption in this literature is that the transport costs of
the intermediate good and the ﬁnal good vary independently. In fact, the
transport costs of the intermediate good and of the ﬁnal good vary in pro-
portion as they are both inﬂuenced by the general quality of the transport
and communication infrastructure. Hence, KRUGMAN and VENABLES
(1995) assume a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive industry where
each variety is both a consumer good and an intermediate good used by each
ﬁrm. Under this assumption, they conclude that the ﬁrms disperse for high
transport costs in order to relax competition and serve the local demand.
For low transport costs, the competition eﬀect is no longer important, and
the ﬁrms agglomerate in order to make full use of cost linkages. 1
T h em a j o ri n c o n v e n i e n c ew i t ht h i sr e s u l ti st h a ti ti m p l i e st h a tt h ed e g r e e
of divisibility of the upstream and downstream industries is the same. The
classical paper by KOOPMANS and BECKMANN (1957) shows that the
issue of the location of ﬁr m st h a te n g a g ei ni n p u tt r a n s a c t i o n si sn o nt r i v i a l
if the degree of divisibility of the vertically-related industries is diﬀerent.
Otherwise, the transport costs of the intermediate good can be avoided by
jointly locating a fraction of the upstream and a fraction of the downstream
1For very low transport costs, if wages are elastic to employment, the ﬁrms can disperse
again in order to avoid ﬁerce competition in the labor market.Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 3
industries. With this assumption, BELLEFLAMME and TOULEMONDE
(2003) conclude that a symmetric division of upstream and downstream ﬁrms
between the regions is always an equilibrium.
In this paper, it is assumed that the number of ﬁrms in the two indus-
t r i e si sd i ﬀerent. A monopolist ﬁrm supplies an intermediate good to two
downstream ﬁrms that compete in quantities in the market of the ﬁnal good.
Implicitly, economies of scale are supposed to be more important in the
upstream than in the downstream industry. Firstly, the ﬁrms decide their
locations in two regions. Then, the upstream ﬁrm selects the delivered price
of the input and ﬁnally the downstream ﬁrms compete in quantities. The
transport costs of the intermediate good and of the consumer good vary in
proportion. Although the set of equilibria of this game is not characterized,
an attempt is made to assess whether or not there exists a full agglomeration
equilibrium for diﬀerent values of the transport costs.
Basically, the increase in transport costs has two opposing eﬀects on the
existence of agglomeration. On one hand, an increase in the transport cost of
the intermediate good helps to develop agglomeration because it strengthens
the advantage of the input supplier’s location as a low production cost site
for each ﬁnal producer. The higher the transport cost of the intermediate
good in relation to the transport cost of the ﬁnal good, the stronger is this
eﬀect.
On the other hand, an increase in the transport cost of the consumer good
encourages the downstream ﬁrms to become geographically isolated in order
to relax intra-regional competition and to be close to local consumers. The
fact that the increase in the transport costs has two opposite eﬀects upon
the location of the consumer goods ﬁrms makes it likely that the relationship
between the general level of transport costs and the agglomeration of ﬁrms
will be nonmonotonic.
This paper follows the analysis made by PONTES (2003), where a similar
model of a vertically-related duopoly was presented. In contrast to the former
analysis, which was limited to a consideration of interior solutions, in which
each ﬁrm exports and sells a positive amount of product in each region, this
paper also considers corner solutions, where at least one ﬁrm is restricted to
selling only in its local market. The consideration of corner solutions allows
an examination of the equilibrium of locations in the whole space of parame-
ters and reveals a nonmonotonic relationship between agglomeration and the
overall level of transport costs when the transport cost of the intermediate
good is low in relation to the transport cost of the ﬁnal good. This patternAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 4
generalizes the ”U inverted” pattern that was obtained by KRUGMAN and
VENABLES (1995) and VENABLES (1996) in the sense that agglomeration
and dispersion alternate when the transport costs vary.
In section 2, a three-stage noncooperative game is presented. The main
conclusions are drawn in section 3.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We suppose a spatial economy that obeys the following assumptions:
1. The economy has two regions A and B with the same number of con-
sumers. Units are chosen so that this number is normalized to 1. The
distance between the regions is 1 by convention. The distance between
two points in the same region is zero.
2. There are two vertically-related industries. A downstream industry
produces a homogeneous consumer good. In order to produce one unit
of this good, it uses one unit of an intermediate good supplied by an
upstream industry. The cost of the input is the only production cost of
the downstream industry. The upstream industry has a constant unit
production cost c.
3. Downstream ﬁrms compete in quantities and take as given the price of
the intermediate good quoted by the upstream ﬁrm.
4. There is one upstream ﬁrm and two downstream ﬁrms, so that, implic-
itly, economies of scale are more important for the input supplier than
for the ﬁnal producers.
5. Each consumer has a linear demand function q = a − bp.
6. Each ﬁrm transports and delivers its product.
7. The transport costs of the intermediate and the ﬁnal good vary in
proportion. Therefore, the unit transport cost of the ﬁnal good is t and
the transport cost of the intermediate good is kt where it is assumed
that k ∈ (0,1).Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 5
In order to obtain results more easily, we specify the following parameters:
a = b =1
c =0
2.2 Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium
The interaction of the three ﬁrms can be modeled by means of a noncooper-
ative game with three stages:
First stage: The ﬁrms simultaneously select their locations in regions A
and B.
Second stage: The upstream monopolist ﬁrm selects the delivered price
of the intermediate good.2
Third stage: The downstream ﬁrms compete through the choice of quan-
tities.
The full characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria is not attempted
here. Instead, the analysis focuses on the existence of a full agglomeration
equilibrium, with all ﬁrms located in region A, without loss of generality.
The whole space of parameters is considered for this purpose, not only the
subset where each ﬁrm is active in the market of each region.
Let the downstream ﬁrms be labeled 1 and 2, and the upstream ﬁrm be
labeled 3. Then the following lemma is straightforward:
Proposition 2 If all ﬁrms locate in region A,s ot h a t(s1,s 2,s 3)=( A,A,A),
am o v eb yt h eu p s t r e a mﬁrm to region B is never proﬁtable, so that π3 (A,A,A) >
π3 (A,A,B).
Proof. If the downstream ﬁrms locate in A, all the derived demand of
the input is made in that region. If the upstream ﬁrm moves to B,i tm u s t
address the same demand curve and bear an additional transport cost t of
the intermediate good.
We begin by evaluating the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms in the subgame
that begins with the choice of locations (A,A,A) in the ﬁrst stage of the
game.
The sustainability of the agglomeration of all ﬁrms in region A is checked
for all values of the parameters k and t, considering t in ascending order.
Two main regions in the parameters space are considered: region I, where
2In this case, selection of the optimal price or the optimal quantity give the same result.Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 6
the downstream ﬁrms located in A can export to B, because the transport
costs are low; and region II, where the exports by downstream ﬁrms located
in A are not feasible.
Region I is further subdivided according to the markets where a moving
downstream ﬁrm located in B is active. In subregion I.1, the moving down-
stream ﬁrm located in B is active in both markets because the transport cost
is low. In subregion I.2,t h em o v i n gﬁrm can sell only in its local market,
although the ﬁrm located in A c a ns e l li nb o t hm a r k e t s . I ns u b r e g i o nI .3,
each downstream ﬁrm can sell only in its local market.
Region II is also subdivided. In subregion II.1, the moving downstream
ﬁrm located in B can import the intermediate good and produces a positive
output. In subregion II.2, the transport cost of the input is too high and the
downstream ﬁrm located in B is unable to produce.
We ﬁrst consider the case where the downstream ﬁrms are active not only
in market A but also in market B. Their proﬁt functions in the third stage
are:
π1 (A,A,A)=( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q1a +[ 1− (q1b + q2b) − wa − t]q1b
π2 (A,A,A)=( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q2a +[ 1− (q1b + q2b) − wa − t]q2b
(1)
where q1a,q 2a,q 1b,q 2b are the quantities sold by ﬁrms 1 and 2 in markets A
and B and wa is the delivered price of the input region A.
Maximizing the proﬁt functions in relation to the quantities, we obtain
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The proﬁt function of the upstream ﬁrm is
π3 = waxa
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The condition of an interior equilibrium (region I) where both ﬁrms are









If we substitute quantities 4 and input price 3 in the proﬁt functions of
















On the other hand, if t>2
3, we have a corner solution (region II) where the






In this case, the proﬁt functions of the consumer goods ﬁrms are
π1 =( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q1a (7)
π2 =( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q2a
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The proﬁt function of the upstream ﬁrm is
π3 = waxa
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Substituting this price of the intermediate good in 8a, the proﬁtm a x i -








Substituting these quantities and input price 9 in proﬁt functions 7, we









Figure 1 plots the regions where the interior solution (region I) and the
corner solution (region II) hold.
In order to assess whether or not there exists an agglomerated equilibrium
(A,A,A), we consider a move of a downstream ﬁrm (ﬁrm 2 w.l.g.) to region
B.T h e p r o ﬁtability of this move is evaluated for diﬀerent levels of the
parameters k and t. We consider the values of t in ascending order.
In region I of Figure 1, if t is low, the moving consumer goods ﬁrm is
able to sell in both regions. This corresponds to subregion I.1.T h e p r o ﬁt
functions of the downstream ﬁrms are
π1 (A,B,A)=( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q1a +[ 1− (q1b + q2b) − wa − t]q1b
π2 (A,B,A)=( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wb − t)q2a +[ 1− (q1b + q2b) − wb]q2b
(11)
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Figure 1: Interior and corner solutions for ﬁrms located in region AAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 10











The proﬁt function of the upstream ﬁrm is
π3 = waxa +( wb − kt)xb








































































As u ﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o ra l lt h eq u a n t i t i e st ob ep o s i t i v ei st h a tq∗
2a > 0.
If this condition is met, the ﬁrm in region B imports the intermediate good
from region A and is able to sell the consumer good in this region. The
condition that deﬁnes subregion I.1 is
q
∗




If we substitute outputs 14 and input prices 13 in the proﬁtf u n c t i o no f
























Putting together 6 and 16, we can solve the inequality
π2 (A,A,A) > π2 (A,B,A)Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 11
Figure 2: Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in subregion I.1
which can be shown to mean that
0 <t<
2k
4+k +2 k2 (17)
In Figure 2, we plot together the lines t =
2
7+4 k
(from 15) and t = 2
3
(from 5). We also plot the condition of the non-proﬁtability of a change of
location by ﬁrm 2, t<
2k
4+k + k2 (from 17), thus deﬁning the region where
(A,A,A) is an equilibrium of locations.
It can be easily seen that in this case the agglomeration of all ﬁrms in
region A is sustainable for all values of t, such that condition 15 holds, ifAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 12
the ratio between the transport costs of the intermediate good and of the
ﬁnal good k is higher than a threshold (≈ 0.56). If k is smaller than this
threshold, agglomeration in A is a location equilibrium if the general level of




, the output sold by ﬁrm 2 in region A is zero. We assume
that the output sold by ﬁrm 1 in market B is positive, q1b > 0,a n dt h e
economy is in subregion I.2. The proﬁt functions of the downstream ﬁrms
are:
π1 (A,B,A)=( 1 − (q1a + q2a) − wa)q1a +[ 1− (q1b + q2b) − wa − t]q1b
π2 (A,B,A)=( 1 − (q1b + q2b) − wb)q2b (18)


































The derived demands of the input in regions A and B is:
xa = q1a + q1b
xb = q2b
The proﬁt function of the upstream ﬁrm is
π3 = waxa +( wb − kt)xb
Maximizing this proﬁt function, the proﬁt-maximizing delivered prices of
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The border condition q∗







2b from 21 and wb from 20 in the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm













From 6 and 23, it is possible to write the condition of the non-proﬁtability
of a move from region A to region B by ﬁrm 2 as
π2 (A,A,A) > π2 (A,B,A)
It is easily seen that this condition holds for any values of t if 1
4 <k<1.
For k<1
4, the condition is satisﬁed if
t<
1




10 − 48k +3 2 k2
´
(24)
The border conditions deﬁning region I.2., as given by t> 2
7+4k (the
opposite of 15) and 22, are plotted in Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, the condition
24 of the non-proﬁtability of a move from region A to region B by ﬁrm
2i sa l s op l o t t e d ,d e ﬁning the region where (A,A,A) is an equilibrium of
locations.
In subregion I.3, although t<2
3, transport costs are high enough so that
each ﬁrm sells only in its local market, so that q2a = q1b =0 . Hence the
proﬁt functions of the downstream ﬁrms are
π1 (A,B,A)=( 1 − q1a − wa)q1a (25)
π2 (A,B,A)=( 1 − q2b − wb)q2bAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 14
Figure 3: Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in subregion I.2Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 15















The derived demand of the input in each region is given by
xa = q1a
xb = q2b
The proﬁt function of the upstream ﬁrm is given by
π3 = waxa +( wb − kt)xb
Maximizing this proﬁt function, we obtain the optimal delivered prices of




























It is easy to see that the condition q∗
2b > 0 ⇔ t<1
k is always met in
region I.3., where t<2
3 holds. Substituting the input price wb from 27 and
the output q∗
2b from 28 in the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm 2, as given by 25, we










This proﬁt can be compared with the proﬁtt h a tﬁrm 2 obtains in the
agglomeration, given by 6, in order to derive the condition of the non-
proﬁtability of a move by this ﬁrm.
π2 (A,A,A) > π2 (A,B,A)Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 16
Figure 4: Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in subregion I.3





−8+1 8 k − 2
√
26 − 72k +7 2 k2
´
(30)
In Figure 4, we plot the border conditions given by t> 4
11−4k(the opposite
of 15) and by t<2
3. The condition of the non-proﬁtability of a move by ﬁrm
2, given by 30, is also plotted, thus deﬁning the region where (A,A,A) is a
locational equilibrium.
We now consider region II with t>2
3,w h e r et h eﬁrms agglomerated in A
only sell in their home market. In this case, we have to consider two diﬀerent
subregions. In the ﬁrst subregion, labelled II.1., t<1
k holds so that the
output of the moving ﬁrm 2 is given by 28 and its proﬁt is expressed by 29.Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 17
Figure 5: Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in region II.
As the proﬁto fﬁrm 2 when it is agglomerated in region A is given by 10,
the condition of the non-proﬁtability of a change of location
π2 (A,A,A) > π2 (A,B,A)





In Figure 5, we plot the border conditions t>2
3,t< 1
k and the condition
of the non-proﬁtability of a change of location given by 31, thus deﬁning the
region where (A,A,A) is a locational equilibrium.
In subregion II.2, where t>1
k,i fﬁrm 2 agglomerates in region A, it
has a positive proﬁt given by 10, while if it moves to region B it has zero
proﬁts since production is not feasible in region B on account of the highAgglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 18
Figure 6: Existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in the space of parame-
ters (k,t)
transport costs of the intermediate good produced in region A. Hence, in
this subregion, (A,A,A) is a locational equilibrium as shown in Figure 5.
In Figure 6, we superimpose all the previous ﬁgures in order to obtain a
representation of the region of the space of parameters where the agglomer-
ation of the three ﬁrms in region A is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
three-stage game.
3C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Two main conclusions follow from the inspection of the region where the
agglomeration is a locational equilibrium in the space of parameters (k,t).Agglomeration in a vertically-linked oligopoly 19
The ﬁrst unsurprising conclusion is that the region where the agglomerated
equilibrium holds expands as k increases. As the previous literature in this
ﬁeld has shown, if the transport cost of intermediate goods is high in relation
to the transport cost of ﬁnal goods, the ﬁrms that produce the ﬁnal goods
have no incentive to leave the location where the input is supplied. The
second and more personal conclusion is that, for relatively low values of k,t h e
existence of an agglomerated equilibrium varies non-monotonically with the
overall level of transport costs. This nonmonotonic pattern derives from the
fact that the increase in transport costs has two opposing eﬀects. An increase
in the transport cost of the intermediate good creates an incentive for the
upstream and downstream ﬁrms to cluster. But an increase in the transport
cost of the consumer good leads downstream ﬁrms to become geographically
isolated in order to relax intra-regional competition and cater for the local
consumers in each region. This pattern is a generalization of the ”U inverted”
pattern by KRUGMAN and VENABLES (1995) and VENABLES (1996) and
it yields the well known conclusion that agglomeration occurs if transport
costs are low in the speciﬁcc a s ew h e r ee a c hﬁrm is active in each market.
This analysis could be extended by considering that the location decisions
of ﬁrms change the production costs related with the primary factors of
production in each region. With this generalization, it would be necessary
to check the non-proﬁtability of a move by the input supplier away from
the agglomeration, since a locational shift could reduce its production costs,
although it would entail additional transport costs of the intermediate good.
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